doc: minor improvments.

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Alexandre Pujol 2023-10-21 00:13:30 +01:00
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@ -11,17 +11,9 @@ possible to write an AppArmor profile for all of them. Therefore, a question ari
**What to confine and why?**
We take inspiration from the [Android/ChromeOS Security Model][android_model] and
we apply it to the Linux world. Modern [Linux security distributions][clipos] usually
consider an immutable core base image with a carefully selected set of applications.
Everything else should be sandboxed. Therefore, this project tries to confine all
the *core* applications you will usually find in a Linux system: all systemd services,
xwayland, network, bluetooth, your desktop environment... Non-core user applications
are out of scope as they should be sandboxed using a dedicated tool (minijail,
bubblewrap, toolbox...).
We take inspiration from the [Android/ChromeOS Security Model][android_model], and we apply it to the Linux world. Modern [Linux security distributions][clipos] usually consider an immutable core base image with a carefully selected set of applications. Everything else should be sandboxed. Therefore, this project tries to confine all the *core* applications you will usually find in a Linux system: all systemd services, xwayland, network, bluetooth, your desktop environment... Non-core user applications are out of scope as they should be sandboxed using a dedicated tool (minijail, bubblewrap, toolbox...).
This is fundamentally different from how AppArmor is usually used on Linux servers
as it is common to only confine the applications that face the internet and/or the users.
This is fundamentally different from how AppArmor is usually used on Linux servers as it is common to only confine the applications that face the internet and/or the users.
[android_model]: https://arxiv.org/pdf/1904.05572