docs: multiple english corrections.
Co-authored-by: Thomas LAURENT <thomas.laurent@ucdconnect.ie>
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@ -12,15 +12,15 @@ possible to write an AppArmor profile for all of them. Therefore, a question ari
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**What to confine and why?**
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We take inspiration from the [Android/ChromeOS Security Model][android_model] and
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we apply it to the Linux world. Modern [Linux security distribution][clipos] usually
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consider an immutable core base image with a carefully set of selected applications.
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we apply it to the Linux world. Modern [Linux security distributions][clipos] usually
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consider an immutable core base image with a carefully selected set of applications.
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Everything else should be sandboxed. Therefore, this project tries to confine all
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the *core* applications you will usually find in a Linux system: all systemd services,
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xwayland, network, bluetooth, your desktop environment... Non-core user applications
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are out of scope as they should be sandboxed using a dedicated tool (minijail,
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bubblewrap, toolbox...).
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This is fundamentally different from how AppArmor is usually used on Linux server
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This is fundamentally different from how AppArmor is usually used on Linux servers
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as it is common to only confine the applications that face the internet and/or the users.
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